The recent wave of mass arrests in Iran has once again brought the charge of Moharebeh to the forefront as a judicial instrument used against protesters, civil society activists, and even ordinary citizens whose involvement was limited to mere presence at protest scenes or acts of assistance. This practice persists despite the fact that, under Article 279 of the Islamic Penal Code, Moharebeh is defined as a narrowly circumscribed criminal offense with clearly delineated elements and strict conditions for its realization. Nevertheless, recent statements by the Tehran Public and Revolutionary Prosecutor, asserting that acts such as arson of public property, destruction, or even assistance to protesters may be prosecuted under the charge of Moharebeh, reflect an expansive and unrestrained interpretation of this offense—one that exceeds the explicit wording of the law and facilitates the imposition of severe hadd punishments, including the death penalty.
Pursuant to Article 279 of the Islamic Penal Code, Moharebeh is defined as “drawing a weapon with the intent to endanger life, property, or honor, or to intimidate people in a manner that results in insecurity in the environment.” The realization of this offense requires the cumulative fulfillment of three essential elements: the material element, the mental element, and the resultant harm. With regard to the material element, the mere possession, carrying, or storage of a weapon—absent its actual use or drawing—does not constitute Moharebeh, nor do personal altercations lacking a public dimension fall within its scope. As a result-based offense, Moharebeh requires that the display or use of a weapon lead to public intimidation and the creation of societal insecurity. Moreover, not every dangerous object qualifies as a weapon within the meaning of Article 279; items such as sticks, stones, or work tools are not inherently weapons unless, under specific circumstances, they are conventionally used as such—an assessment that must be made through a strict and defendant-favorable interpretation of criminal law.
From the perspective of the mental element, Moharebeh necessitates the intent to create public fear and insecurity. Where the perpetrator’s motive is personal or lacks a public-oriented purpose, the offense is not established. Likewise, the realization of the result—namely, the actual occurrence of fear or insecurity within society—is an indispensable condition for the offense. Absent the verification of any of these three elements, not only does the charge of Moharebeh fail to materialize, but the imposition of hadd punishments under Article 282 of the Islamic Penal Code—including execution, crucifixion, amputation of the right hand and left foot, or exile—also lacks legal justification. Despite this, prevailing judicial practice indicates that these legal requirements are systematically disregarded.
The expansive interpretation of Moharebeh gives rise to a fundamental conflict with international human rights principles, particularly Iran’s binding obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The principle of legality in criminal law, enshrined in Article 15 of the Covenant, requires that criminal offenses be defined with sufficient precision, clarity, and foreseeability. However, concepts such as “intimidation” and “creation of insecurity” within the definition of Moharebeh lack objective and clearly delineated criteria, thereby enabling arbitrary and discretionary interpretations that seriously undermine the principle of legal foreseeability. This problem is further exacerbated by violations of the principle of strict interpretation of criminal law and the rule of interpretation in favor of the accused, resulting in the inclusion of conduct that does not satisfy the essential elements of the offense.
Furthermore, proceedings involving Moharebeh charges are frequently accompanied by systemic violations of the right to a fair trial, including denial of access to independent legal counsel, reliance on confessions obtained under conditions of detention, severe restrictions on the right to defense, and expedited proceedings before Revolutionary Courts. These deficiencies, combined with the manifest disproportionality between the alleged conduct and the prescribed punishments—particularly the death penalty—have transformed Moharebeh into a mechanism of judicial repression. According to authoritative interpretations by the UN Human Rights Committee, the death penalty may only be imposed for the “most serious crimes,” understood to involve intentional killing. The application of capital punishment in Moharebeh cases that do not involve lethal outcomes therefore constitutes a clear violation of the right to life. In sum, the contemporary application of Moharebeh reflects a departure from its exceptional and narrowly defined legal framework, converting it into a tool for suppressing dissent and curtailing fundamental freedoms—an outcome that renders comprehensive reconsideration of its definition, interpretation, and application both necessary and unavoidable.
Maryam Abedi – Human Rights Researcher
