At a time when the international criminal justice system, at the institutional level, faces fundamental constraints arising from political deadlocks within the Security Council and the weakness of referral mechanisms, the domestic prosecution of international crimes on the basis of universal jurisdiction has become a central pillar of international criminal accountability. A pillar that many scholars today describe as the backbone of the future of international criminal law. This principle, grounded in the protection of the collective interests of the international community and the repression of the gravest crimes—including crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes—enables states to exercise criminal jurisdiction even in the absence of any territorial, personal, or nationality link.
In light of the scale and increasing intensity of evidence documented by human rights organizations regarding the commission of crimes against humanity by the ruling regime in Iran—including recurrent patterns of killing protesters, the use of live ammunition against unarmed civilians, mass and arbitrary arrests, systematic torture in detention facilities, enforced disappearances, and the deliberate and nationwide shutdown of internet access aimed at concealing violations—the activation of the capacities of states exercising universal jurisdiction to initiate preliminary investigations has become a legal, practical, and political necessity.
Within this framework, the institutional innovation of “structural investigations,” first developed by the German Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office and operationalized in cases concerning large-scale crimes committed in Syria, constitutes a central instrument for addressing the situation in Iran. Structural investigations make it possible to initiate criminal proceedings in the absence of identified suspects and without requiring the physical presence of the accused. Under this model, the focus shifts from the individual prosecution of low-level perpetrators toward the identification and documentation of the structure of criminality itself: chains of command, patterns of organization and decision-making at senior levels, and mechanisms of coordination among relevant institutions.
This approach allows for the establishment of the structural elements of crimes—most notably the “widespread or systematic” nature of the attack against the civilian population—not on the basis of isolated incidents, but through a methodical examination of an organized “criminal system.” In the context of Iran, such an approach enables the documentation and analysis of key decisions taken at the highest levels of authority, the hierarchical structure of security and military institutions, the operational modalities of repression, and the coordination mechanisms among various governmental bodies.
One of the most significant consequences of this mechanism is the practical reinforcement of the principle of “no safe haven.” By generating a comprehensive repository of evidence and ready-made legal analyses, structural investigations enable prosecutors to act promptly—upon the entry of any suspect into the territory of a state exercising universal jurisdiction—on the basis of existing, substantiated material, without the need to initiate investigations from scratch. This deterrent effect is particularly relevant with respect to senior officials who, due to diplomatic assignments, official travel, or medical treatment, are exposed to international mobility.
Experience from several European jurisdictions in cases relating to Syria demonstrates that structural investigations cannot be effectively initiated or sustained without a supportive framework grounded in organized cooperation between prosecutorial authorities and civil society. What contemporary legal literature describes as the “prosecutorial–NGO complex” refers to a strategic network of targeted cooperation between specialized units for international crimes and civil society organizations, particularly those active within diaspora communities.
This network fulfills three primary functions. First, it channels, verifies, and standardizes evidence. Many Iranian human rights organizations operating abroad have access to unique sources, including witnesses in exile, digital documentation, video testimonies, and materials extracted from within the country, which—when properly processed—can be transformed into legally admissible evidence for criminal proceedings. Second, it fills analytical and expertise gaps. Understanding Iran’s security, political, and institutional mechanisms and translating them into the language of international criminal law requires a combination of legal knowledge, institutional insight, and contextual sensitivity that is often present among diaspora-based experts. Third, it provides legal, security, and psychological support for victims and witnesses, which constitutes a prerequisite for their meaningful participation in criminal processes.
In sum, given the absence of any domestic accountability mechanisms in Iran and the impossibility of referring the situation to the International Criminal Court due to political obstacles—most notably the risk of veto within the Security Council—the activation of domestic proceedings based on universal jurisdiction represents the only practical avenue for accountability for crimes against humanity committed by the ruling regime in Iran. From this perspective, Iranian and international human rights organizations should move beyond an exclusive focus on general documentation and prioritize the production of evidence and reports specifically tailored for use in structural investigations. Likewise, states such as Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, and France, which possess established capacities in the field of universal jurisdiction, should allocate effective resources to initiate or expand structural investigations related to the situation in Iran. Such measures would not only send a clear message regarding the commitment to combating impunity, but would also contribute in practice to reaffirming the role of states in the enforcement of international criminal justice and to strengthening alternative accountability pathways in the face of persistent geopolitical deadlock.
Sina Yousefi / Researcher in International Law
