Since 28 December, 2026, following protests by shopkeepers and market traders against economic instability and calls for business closures to reclaim their rights, large numbers of Iranians across the country took to the streets peacefully. However, from the very early hours, the government attempted to suppress the protests through the unlawful use of violence, employing live ammunition and tear gas.
From Thursday, January 8, 2026 concurrent with the presence of thousands of protesters in the streets and the complete shutdown of the internet by the Islamic Republic government, the repression of protesters has turned into widespread and all-out killing. According to reports, in less than 72 hours after the internet shutdown, confirmed accounts indicate the sighting of the bodies of at least 70 protesters in just one hospital in Rasht, and a total of 200 protesters in hospitals in Tehran.
Officials and state media continuously emphasize the “armed nature of the protesters,” labeling them as mohareb (those waging war against the state) and rioters, thereby attempting to justify the extensive use of lethal weapons against protesters.
The Jurists’ Council for a Democratic Iran explicitly stresses that such attempts have no legal basis and can never justify the killing of protesters. The council emphasizes that even acts of violence by protesters—which in the vast majority of cases must be regarded as legitimate self-defense against the unlawful and criminal violence of security forces—cannot justify the use of military-grade weapons against protesters. Labeling protesters as terrorists or armed is merely a code word for the commission of crimes against humanity.
During the 2022-23 protests, the regime’s officials classified the protests as a ‘hybrid war’ from the beginning, as part of a coordinated and widespread effort by the highest-ranking authorities of the IRI, laying the groundwork for framing the protesters as ‘Moharebeh’, an Islamic term for insurgents or combatants.
The term was used for the first time in direct reference to the protests by multiple political, military and security officials on 21 September 2022. As a direct result of such criminal framing, on the same night if 21 September, the deaths toll reached its first peak with 62 killed civilians. (See JFI’s report “weapons of mass suppression: waging war against civilians.”
The definition of a “civilian population” under international humanitarian law (IHL) and international criminal law, as applied to crimes against humanity in Article 7 of the Rome Statute, encompasses all persons who are not members of armed forces or organized armed groups taking direct part in hostilities. This draws from customary IHL, including precedents from the ICTY such as the “Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al.” judgment, which established that the targeting, not only a civilian population, but even a population that is “predominantly civilian” in nature amounts to crimes against humanity. A population qualifies as predominantly civilian even if some non-civilians, such as combatants, armed individuals, or those sporadically resorting to violence, are present within it. The mere presence of such elements does not deprive the group of its civilian character, as affirmed in Kunarac and consistent with Article 50(3) of Additional Protocol I, which protects the overall civilian status unless non-civilians predominate.
This principle is reinforced in ICC jurisprudence, including the “Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga” judgment (Trial Chamber II, 7 March 2014), where the Chamber convicted Katanga as an accessory to crimes against humanity (murder) and war crimes, including directing attacks against a “predominantly civilian” population (primarily Hema civilians) during the 2003 Bogoro attack in the DRC. The ICC has emphasized that isolated or incidental involvement of armed individuals does not negate the civilian character of the population or justify reclassifying the entire group as combatants or insurgents. Consequently, under Article 7, even if a few within a predominantly civilian gathering resort to violence, this cannot lawfully strip the population of its protected status, preventing states or actors from blanket-labeling and targeting such groups as “insurgents” or “terrorists” to evade accountability for crimes against humanity like murder, persecution, or other inhumane acts directed against civilians.
In conclusion, the council warns all agents and perpetrators of these crimes that such acts will not be subject to any statute of limitations or amnesty. The council will use all of its capacities, including the use of mechanisms such as the principle of universal jurisdiction, to pursue justice and hold the perpetrators accountable.
Jurists’ Council for a Democratic Iran
January 2026
